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There is a growing literature revolving around the role of non-State actors in the international 
law-making process. The starting point of this article is that although informal international law-
making may not be legally binding, it would be unwise to dismiss it as legally irrelevant. Informal 
law-making can be relevant with respect to conceptualising and applying existing law, as well as 
guiding future regulation. The present discussion is placed in the context of cyberspace and, more 
specifically, the Internet standardisation bodies‟ informal law-making functions when creating 
Internet protocols by setting Internet standards. The article addresses the legitimacy and the 
ongoing work of the Internet Advisory Board and Internet Engineering Task Force in setting 
Internet standards with the aim to protect Internet users from mass surveillance and serious 
threats to privacy online. The article makes two main arguments. First, the effective protection of 
online privacy cannot be understood only in terms of compliance with legal frameworks but– in 
practice - that also needs to be secured through technological means. Second, in the area of online 
privacy informal law-making and international law converge in a distinctive way. Internet 
standards should not necessarily be seen as “living a parallel life” to law or as displacing or 
merely complementing the law. Technical standards and international law can actively inform 
one another and converge in their application. The analysis explores the implications of the 
Internet‟s technical features to policy-making and legal reasoning by discussing State and judicial 
practice. The article demonstrates how the technical perspective on privacy informs and enriches 
the manner in which the legal advisor argues about privacy, the legislator articulates the interests 
at stake and the judge and practitioner interpret and apply international human rights law.  
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There is a growing literature revolving around the role of non-State actors in the international 
law-making process. The starting point of this article is that, although informal international law-
making may not be legally binding, it would be unwise to dismiss it as legally irrelevant. Informal 
law-making can be relevant with respect to conceptualising and applying existing law as well as 
guiding future regulation. The present discussion is placed in the context of cyberspace and, more 
specifically, the Internet standardisation bodies‟ informal law-making functions when creating 
Internet protocols (by setting Internet standards). Despite the emerging interest in the informal 
law-making activities of standardisation bodies,
1
 the work of the Internet Architecture Board 
(IAB) and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has escaped the attention of international 
                                                     
1
  For example, A von Bogdandy and others (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority in International 
Institutions (Springer 2010); A Peters and others (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (CUP 
2009); J Pauwelyn, R Wessel, J Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (OUP 2012); 
Sanderijn Duquet and others, „Upholding the Rule of Law in Informal International Lawmaking 
Processes‟ (2014) 6 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 75-95. 
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lawyers. This is not the first time that novel international bodies appear, at first, insignificant or 
irrelevant in the eyes of international lawyers.
2 
 
The article addresses in particular how the Internet standardisation bodies create informal law-
making (Internet standards) with the aim to protect Internet users from mass surveillance and 
serious threats to privacy online. Recent revelations that States conduct mass and indiscriminate 
surveillance and eavesdrop on digital communications demonstrate that “governmental mass 
surveillance emerges as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure”.3 The 
consequences of pervasive monitoring
4
 cannot be duly appreciated unless one underlines that the 
exercise of the right to privacy is also a prerequisite for realizing other human rights – both online 
and offline
5
 - and that serious and systematic attacks on online privacy further undermine 
relations among States, confidence of the citizens in the rule of law, and trust in the digital 
economy.
6
 Despite the serious interests at stake, we are far from comprehending fully the 
ramifications of the violation and abuse of privacy by means of pervasive monitoring. Affirming 
that human rights apply equally offline and online is an invaluable and timely pronouncement,
7 
but international lawyers and courts as well as policy makers have just started to explore the 
                                                     
2
  Anne Peters, Simone Peter, „International Organizations: Between Technocracy and Democracy‟ in B 
Fassbender and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 
170-197, 174-175 discussing how international law scholarship ignored, at first, the legal significance 
of the creation of the 19
th
-century international unions.  
3
  Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, „The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age‟, 30 June 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/27/37, [3] (UN Report on the Right to 
Privacy). 
4
  For a definition of pervasive monitoring S Farrell, H Tschofenig (May 2014) „Pervasive Monitoring Is 
an Attack‟, RFC 7258, Best Current Practice 188, 2, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258.txt> 
accessed 1 May 2016. „Pervasive monitoring‟ and „surveillance‟ will be used interchangeable herein. 
5
  UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) [14]; Franck La Rue, „Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression‟, 12 April 2014, UN 
Doc A/HRC/23/40 [24]-[26]; Human Rights Council, Decision 25/117, „Panel on the Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age‟, 15 April 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/DEC/25/117 (adopted with no vote) rec. 9; 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, „Report on Mass Surveillance‟, 18 March 2015, Doc 
13734 [97]. 
6
  European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA Surveillance Program, 
Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and their Impact on EU Citizens‟ Fundamental Rights 
and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 2013/2188(INI) BO, BT, BV, 72, 111-
112.  
7
  UNGA Res 68/167, „The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age‟, 21 January 2014, UN Doc 
A/RES/68/167 (adopted with no vote) [3], [4]; UNGA Res 69/166, „The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age‟, 10 February 2015, UN Doc A/RES/69/166 (adopted with no vote). See also UN HRC 
Res 26/13, „The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet‟, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/26/13 (26 June 2014) (adopted without a vote as orally revised), [1], [5]; UN HRC Res 
20/8, „The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet‟, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/20/8 (5 July 2012) (adopted without a vote); UN HRC Res 32/13, „The Promotion, 
Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet‟ (1 July 2016) (adopted without a vote as 
orally revised). 
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implications of the Internet‟s technical features to policy-making and legal reasoning.8 The 
analysis and findings come to reinforce the point of the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy with 
regard to fully exploring the potential of international law, including binding and non-binding 
instruments, with a view to protect privacy online.
9
 The article makes two main arguments. First, 
it argues that the effective protection of online privacy cannot be understood only in terms of 
compliance with legal frameworks but that – in practice - it also needs to be secured through 
technological means. Second, the article argues that, in the area of online privacy, informal law-
making and international law converge in a distinctive way. Technical (Internet) standards should 
not necessarily be seen as “living a parallel life” to law or as displacing or merely complementing 
the law. The article shows how technical standards and international law can actively inform one 
another and converge in their application.  
The analysis is structured into three main parts. The first part introduces the informal law-making 
work of the Internet‟s technical standardisation bodies – the IAB and IETF. The Internet is 
regulated and managed by technical standards which are developed by private bodies. The design 
of the network and Internet protocols by default encapsulate regulation and, therefore, 
international informal law-making is instrumental to how, and to what extent, the right to online 
privacy can be protected. The discussion explains the legal value of Internet standards from an 
international informal law-making point of view and assesses the legitimacy of the standards and 
the standard-setting process. The second part argues that protecting privacy online falls within the 
remit of the IETF‟s standardisation work. The IETF, however, does not value privacy as a human 
right per se, or as a legal consideration, but rather as an instrumental value that must be 
understood as a necessary condition for restoring and maintaining users‟ trust in the Internet. The 
bodies focus on adopting a series of technical solutions, which will have a significant impact on 
the protection of end users from surveillance and serious threats to their privacy online. Work in 
progress includes the integration of Privacy by Design
10
 into the core Internet protocols that form 
                                                     
8
 Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, „NETmundial Multi-stakeholder 
Statement‟, São Paulo, 24 April 2014, 9, <http://netmundial.br/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016. 
9
  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, J.A. Cannataci, 8 March 2016, UN Doc 
A/HRC/31/64, [46 (j)]. 
10
  Privacy by Design is different from privacy-enhancing technologies in that the former is a general 
requirement of the core architecture of a system or product, whereas the latter are employed to 
strengthen privacy-related components of the system, as a second stage, when the architecture is 
already in place.  The term „privacy by design‟ was coined by Dr Ann Cavoukian, former Information 
and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada. For a quick overview of different approaches see Ann 
Cavoukian, „Privacy by Design in Law, Policy and Practice – A White Paper for Regulators, 
Decision-makers and Policy-makers‟ (2011) 19-24, 
<http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/08/pbd-law-policy.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016.  
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the Internet‟s basic architecture,11 the creation of a privacy vocabulary and encrypting the web. 
Interestingly, Internet standards are being informed by, and in turn shape and nurture, legal 
standards and business practices. The technical community employs legal definitions and texts in 
order to address the issue of the right to privacy. Conversely, its work on studying the 
implications of, and dangers posed by, mass surveillance not only assists in understanding the 
value of online privacy but also provides insights to much-debated legal questions, such as 
whether metadata fall within the protective scope of privacy, what constitutes an interference with 
privacy and how we legally conceptualise privacy harms in the online environment. Finally, the 
third part proceeds to explore how the technical perspective on privacy can inform the manner in 
which the legal advisor argues about privacy, the legislator articulates the interests at stake and 
the academic and practitioner interpret international human rights law. The relevance of the 
location and nationality of individuals in the digital environment and the interrelation of privacy 
and freedom of expression are questions that require us to revisit our take on interpreting and 
applying international human rights law to privacy online.  
 
2. Internet Standards as Informal Law-making 
Internet governance is highly fragmented in terms of the distribution of authority, reflecting the 
decentralised nature of the Internet itself. The creation and evolution of the Internet are shaped by 
standards, principles, norms, rules and business practices, which are developed in a multi-
stakeholder ecosystem. States, the technical community, industry, civil society, academia and 
global users participate to varying degrees in formal and informal governance arrangements.
12 
Despite this fragmentation and the absence of formal authority, a limited de facto hierarchy exists 
in the day-to-day management of the Internet.
13
 The Internet‟s engineers and, in particular, the 
IETF and the IAB, are responsible for managing the technical aspects of the Internet. The IETF‟s 
goal is „to make the Internet work better‟14 and its mission is to identify and suggest solutions to 
technical problems. The IAB, in turn, is responsible for reviewing the overall technical and 
                                                     
11
  L Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons on a Connected World (Vintage Books 
2001) 36. 
12
  NETmundial Statement (n 8); World Summit on the Information Society, „Tunis Agenda for the 
Information Society‟ (18 November 2005) WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E [34]; Lee Bygrave, 
Terje Michaelsen, „Governors of the Internet‟ in L-A. Bygrave and J Bing (eds), Internet Governance 
– Infrastructure and Institutions (OUP 2009) 92-125. 
13
  Roger Clarke and others, „A Primer on Internet Technology‟ (1998) 
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/IPrimer.html> accessed 1 May 2016. 
14
  H Alvestrand (October 2004) „A Mission Statement for the IETF‟, RFC 3935, Best Current Practice 
95, 1 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3935> accessed 1 May 2016. 
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engineering development of the Internet.
15
 These two bodies are the most important global 
standard-setters in the field and, therefore, their privacy-related work merits careful study.
16
 This 
section explains the function of the Internet protocols and proceeds to address the protocols‟ 
value as informal law-making. The discussion also assesses the legitimacy of the standards and 
the standard-setting process.  
 
2.1 The Function and Normative Value of Internet Standards 
Internet protocols constitute the backbone of the Internet upon which all the layers of the network 
are created.
17
 As such, they define - to a significant extent - how the Internet functions, and they 
frame the context of its legal regulation.
18
 The core architecture of the Internet is a strong mode of 
regulation itself: technological capabilities and design choices impose rules/constraints on the 
online user regarding access and use of information.
19 
The default settings – from the design of 
the Internet protocols to a particular application or browser - shape the user‟s choices. 
Consequently, Internet protocols are a “hidden” yet powerful regulatory force complementing the 
law, the market and the social norms developed online.
20 
 
An (international) lawyer may perhaps struggle to identify the normative value of these protocols. 
Internet protocols are engineered on the basis of technical standards, known as Internet standards, 
set by the IETF and the IAB.
21
 The Internet was created and is evolving by voluntary adherence 
                                                     
15
  B Carpenter (ed), „Charter of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)‟ (May 2000) IAB, RFC 2850, 
Best Current Practice 39, 2-3 <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3710.txt>  accessed 1 May 2016. 
16
  ML Rustad, Global Internet Law (West Academic Publishing 2014) 69-70. 
17
  L Lessig, Code 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) 145. For an illustrative account of the role of the protocols see 
143-145. 
18
  Joel Reidenberg, „Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology‟ (1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553-593, 582; Steven Wheatley, „Democratic Governance 
Beyond the State: The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors as Standard-Setters‟ in A Peters and others (n 
1) 215-240, 220. 
19
  Seda Gürses, Bettina Berendt, „PETs in the Surveillance Society: A Critical Review of the Potentials 
and Limitations of the Privacy as Confidentiality Paradigm‟ in S Gutwirth, Y Poullet and P de Hert 
(eds), Data Protection in a Profiled World (Springer Science 2010) 301-322, 317. 
20
  In Lessig‟s words “code is law” in Lessig (n 11) 223. Vinton Gray Cerf, „Foreword: Who Rules the 
Net?‟ in A Thierer and CW Crews (eds), Who Rules the Net? (Cato Institute 2003) vii-xiii, vii; 
Graham Greenleaf, „An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture vs Law?‟ (1998) 21 
University New South Wales Law Journal 593-622, 608-617; Benjamin Farrand, Helena Carrapico, 
„Guest Editorial: Networked Governance and the Regulation of Expression on the Internet: The 
Blurring of the Role of Public and Private Actors as Content Regulators‟ (2013) 10 Journal of 
Information Technology & Politics 357-368, 362; Daniel Benoliel, „Technological Standards, Inc.: 
Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory Epistemology‟ (2004) 92 California Law Review 1069-1116. 
21
  S Bradner (October 1996) „The Internet Standards Process – Revision 3‟, RFC 2026, Best Current 
Practice 9, 2 <http://ftp://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt> accessed 1 May 2016. 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 7 NO 5]  
[7] 
 
to these standards. Industry, organisations, Internet users and States adhere to these non-binding 
technical standards and, therefore, acknowledge the regulation of the Internet by informal law-
making. It has been highlighted that „there is no question […] of [the Internet] standards being 
legally binding or not. They are simply implemented by public and private actors‟.22 
  
2.2 The Internet Standard-setting Process and its Legitimacy 
The Internet standard-setting process does not observe formalities traditionally associated with 
the production of domestic or international law in terms of the processes followed, the actors 
involved or the final output.
23 
This informality, however, does not necessarily mean that these 
bodies and the respective standardisation process lack legitimacy.
24
 On the contrary, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that the IETF meets high standards of transparency and inclusiveness.  
A. Stakeholder Participation and Involvement in the Standard-setting Process 
The establishment of the Internet‟s standardisation bodies is informal. The IETF emerged from a 
quasi-academic group of people who created the Internet. It was established as a body in 1986 
and today it is still organised as an activity of the Internet Society (ISOC) - a US non-profit 
entity. The IAB, the members of which are selected from and by the IETF participants, is 
chartered both as a committee of the IETF and as an advisory body of ISOC.
25
 The IETF is 
financially independent, funding its operations from conference fees and ISOC‟s membership 
fees.
26
 Its informality extends also to the internal structure of the two bodies. The IETF does not 
have an elected board. There is no official membership and participation is open to all interested 
individuals on a voluntary basis. Anyone can attend its in-person meetings (held three times per 
                                                     
22
  Duquet and others (n 1) 90; Liv Coleman, „“We Reject: Kings, Presidents and Voting”: Internet 
Community Autonomy in Managing the Growth of the Internet‟ (2013) 10 Journal of Information 
Technology & Politics 171-189, 179; DG Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of 
Cyberspace (OUP 2009) 134-142; Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, Jan Wouters, „Informal 
International Lawmaking: An Assessment and Template to Keep it Both Effective and Accountable‟ 
in Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 1) 500-538, 512. 
23
  Joost Pauwelyn, „Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions‟ 
in Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 1) 13-34, 17. 
24
  See, for example, Duquet and others (n 1); Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, Jan Wouters, „Informal 
International Law as Presumptive Law: Exploring New Modes of Lawmaking‟ in R Liivoja, J Petman 
(eds), International Law-making – Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge Research in 
International Law 2014) 75; Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 22) 521; Pauwelyn (n 23) 18; Dan Burk, 
„Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology‟ (2005) 74 Fordham Law 
Review 537-573, 554. 
25
  Bygrave and Michaelsen (n 12) 96-97. 
26
  Harald Alvestrand, Hakon Wium Lie, „Development of Core Internet Standards: the Work of the 
IETF and W3C‟ in Bygrave, Bing (n 12) 126-146, 128, 135.  
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year) or get involved via its email lists. Participants reflect the multi-stakeholder model and 
include primarily protocol designers, software developers and industry representatives as well as 
government officials, civil society and legal/privacy experts. It should be highlighted that public 
officials participate in the proceedings on an equal footing with other stakeholders. Transparency 
and inclusiveness are in many respects an integral part of the working culture of these bodies and 
their standard-making process.  
That being said, there is scope for improving the participation of stakeholders in the IETF 
community (input legitimacy). There are two key issues in this regard: first, whether the relevant 
stakeholders are engaged in the decision-making process and, second, the quality of these 
stakeholders‟ involvement in, and impact on, the process.27 Starting with the first question, in 
theory, anybody can participate in the standard-setting process. In practice, however, this is not 
the case, given the fact that the IETF discussions are highly technical. Indeed, the IETF has been 
accused of “technical elitism”.28 On the one hand, experienced contributors are needed to come up 
with the best technical solutions in order to avoid the risk of „having good consensus about a bad 
design‟.29 On the other hand, one cannot deny the importance of having stakeholders on board 
who bring different perspectives on the impact and implications of the IETF‟s work. Ideally, 
these should be stakeholders directly affected by the Internet standards or the absence thereof.
30
 
Take the example of whether and, if so, to what extent, a journalist in Turkey or a young gay man 
in Uganda can benefit from secure email communications by using Internet protocols that support 
encryption.
31 
Few end users actually have the ability to follow the technical discussions. One way 
to mitigate the absence of end users from the IETF is to include stakeholders who can mediate for 
them (clearly, not on their behalf) and for their interests.
32
 The Centre for Democracy and 
                                                     
27
  Wolfgang Benedek, „Multi-Stakeholderism in the Development of International Law‟ in U Fastenrath 
and others (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest – Essays in Honour of Judge Simma (OUP 
2011) 201-210, 204-205. 
28
  Joel Reidenberg, „Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet‟, 42 (2002) Jurimetrics 261-280. See 
discussion in Michael Froomkin, „Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace‟ 
(2003) 116 Harvard Law Review 749-873, 795. 
29
  D Crocker, „Making Standards the IETF Way‟ (1993) 
<http://www.isoc.org/internet/standards/papers/crocker-on-standards.shtml> accessed 1 May 2016. 
30
  Wheatley (n 18) 231. 
31
  T Hardie, „A Personal Touchstone for Discussions of Pervasive Passive Monitoring‟, IETF, Internet-
Draft (expired 22 April 2014) <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardie-perpass-touchstone/> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
32
   Eric J. Iversen, Thierry Vedel, Raymund Werle, „Standardisation and the Democratic Design of 
Information and Communication Technology‟ (2004) 17 Knowledge, Technology & Policy 104-126, 
114, 121. 





 is one such public-interest advocacy group actively participating in the 
IETF.  
Turning to the quality of stakeholders‟ participation in the decision-making process, this is an 
issue that can be assessed only empirically. To give an example, the IETF‟s working culture 
consists of creative, highly opinionated scientists who debate over their ideas and proposals. This 
has led to the nurturing of a confrontational environment in which all parties must argue strongly 
for their positions in order to be heard and to persuade others. Yet many people find such an 
environment to be rather inaccessible, or even professionally inappropriate, especially if they 
come from an entirely different cultural background (e.g. Asia).
34 
The IETF community seems to 
have acknowledged the matter and steps are being taken toward promoting greater diversity and 
establishing norms of professional conduct.
35
 
B. Setting the Standards and Navigating the “Tussles” 
In day-to-day work, technical standards are developed by working groups, which are set up to 
address specific operational and technical problems. The groups publish technical standards as 
well as other deliverables, such as guidelines or current best practice.
36
 The standard-setting 
process is stipulated by a detailed set of procedural rules, which includes an appeal mechanism. 
Each new proposal for a specification is initially published as a “Request for Comment” (RFC) 
and it undergoes a period of review and revision, reflecting the strongly collaborative nature of 
the standards‟ development.37 The proposed standard is a draft under discussion until (if) it 
reaches a certain level of maturity and becomes an Internet standard.
38
 There are no formal voting 
rules and new standards are approved by “rough consensus and running code”, which means that 
the value of the ideas is assessed by the empirical evidence for their feasibility and the combined 
                                                     
33
  The Centre is a US-based, non-profit organisation, which aims to preserve the user-controlled nature 
of the Internet and champions freedom of expression <https://cdt.org> accessed 1 May 2016. 
34
  Jorge L. Contreras, „Divergent Patterns of Engagement on Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and 
China‟ 38 (2014) Telecommunications Policy 916-934, 929-930. 
35
  D Crocker, Clark (November 2015) „An IETF with Much Diversity and Professional Conduct‟, RFC 
7704, Informational <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7704.txt accessed 1 May 2016. 
36
  The Best Current Practice (BCP) is a subseries of the RFCs. BCP aims to define and ratify the IETF‟s 
best current thinking on specific issues. BCPs may vary in style and content but are subject to the 
same consensus-building and review process as all proposed standards. See The Internet Standards 
Process – Revision 3 (n 21) 15-16. 
37
  Ibid; R Housley, D Crocker, E Burger (October 2011) „Reducing the Standards Track to Two 
Maturity Levels‟, RFC 6410, Best Current Practice 9 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6410> accessed 1 
May 2016. See also G-P Calliess, P Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code (Hart 
Publishing 2012) discussing the concept of “rough consensus” in contexts other than Internet 
standardisation.  
38
  Reducing the Standards Track to Two Maturity Levels (n 37) 2. 
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engineering judgment of the participants.
39 
Therefore, the process and the final outcome are 
supported by a strong and broad consensus, which is built and reinforced by the voluntary 
adherence of Internet users and the industry to these standards.
40 
The IETF sets a high standard 
for legitimacy among standardisation and informal law-making bodies. Froomkin, in his seminal 
study, found that the IETF standard process „harbors an environment capable of providing the 
“practical discourse” that Habermas suggests is a prerequisite to the creation of morally 
acceptable norms‟.41 Internet standards are not only developed in a collaborative, multi-
stakeholder environment,
42
 but they are also open standards. This means that they are non-
proprietary and no one has exclusive control of a protocol or its implementation, which in turn 
encourages experimentation and innovation.
43 
Open standards encapsulate and, at the same time, 
reinforce the special features of the network in terms of its open, decentralised and interoperable 
architecture.
44 
If it were not for the use of open standards, the interoperability of the network on a 
global scale would not have been feasible.
45 
Finally, Internet drafts and standards are freely 
available on the IETF website, making the informal law-making process transparent, as opposed 
to, for example, ISO standards.
46 
 
Despite the fact that the creation of Internet standards seems to demonstrate a high level of 
legitimacy, the present discussion raises the question of whether broader, societal concerns can be 
taken into account when drafting a standard.
47
 It is clear that for a specification to be adopted it 
needs to be of the highest technical quality and it must be supported by widespread consensus. In 
addition to these criteria, the standardisation process indicates that a third requirement should be 
met: the IETF needs to make an assessment of the interests of all affected parties as well as the 
specification‟s contribution to the Internet.48 Consequently, the standard-setting process is, in 
principle, receptive to external concerns. Does this mean, however, that the IETF will 
                                                     
39
  P. Resnick (June 2014) „On Consensus and Humming in the IETF‟ RFC 7282, Informational 
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7282> accessed 31 August 2016; Alvestrand and Lie (n 26) 132; ML 
Mueller, Ruling the Root (MIT Press 2002) 91. Interestingly, see how Berners-Lee, the inventor of the 
World Wide Web, describes his experience of engaging with the IETF in T Berners-Lee, Weaving the 
Web (Harper Collins Publishers 2000) 53-63. 
40
  Post (n 22) 134-142; Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 22) 512. 
41
  Froomkin (n 28) 871. 
42
  Greenleaf (n 20) 606. 
43
  Lessig (n 11) 145; Mueller (n 39) 91. 
44
  NETmundial Statement (n 8) 5, 7; Council of Europe, „Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on 
Internet Governance Principles‟, 21 September 2011 [8]. 
45
  Berners-Lee (n 39) 16, 163-164, 186; Coleman (n 22) 178. 
46
  <https://datatracker.ietf.org> accessed 1 May 2016. See Timothy Simcoe, „Governing the Anti-
commons: Institutional Design for Standard Setting Organizations‟, 6-7 
<http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12944.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016. 
47
  Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 22) 521; Pauwelyn (n 23) 18. 
48
  The Internet Standards Process – Revision 3 (n 21) 2-3. 
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acknowledge and consider other values and interests outside its technical mandate? For instance, 
will the IETF take freedom of expression or the privacy of the end users into account? The 
answer seems to be in the negative.  
A careful reading of the IETF‟s mandate suggests that it must assess how a specification affects 
the interests of all relevant parties. The IETF will not take privacy into account as a value in 
itself, but instead will consider how an Internet protocol (or the absence thereof) impacts users‟ 
expectations of privacy and, therefore, their trust in the network. This point is further illustrated 
by an Internet-Draft that is currently being discussed in the IETF community. The „representing 
stakeholder rights in Internet protocols‟ draft was a response to the mass surveillance revelations 
and it is an attempt to explore how the IETF encompasses stakeholder rights in Internet protocols 
and how it should address ethical, societal and legal judgments in protocol design.
49
 Yet the draft 
was dropped and, almost a year later, a new draft was submitted to discussion („The Internet is for 
End Users‟). The new draft frames the main issues in an entirely different way; it focuses on 
identifying the different constituencies within the Internet community and evaluating the impact 
of Internet standards on those constituencies‟ interests. This removes from the equation any 
discussion of stakeholder rights/interests or of making societal/legal judgments when designing 
technology: the question rather revolves around the assessment of the impact of technology on the 
users‟ interests. In this way, the IETF remains committed to its technical mandate while still 
considering non-technical issues in the standard-setting process, albeit in a narrow framework. 
The Internet-Draft aims to set guidelines for computer engineers on how to identify different sub 
communities within the Internet community and how to assess the impact of Internet standards on 
them in a more systematic and open fashion.
50 
The draft also stresses that end users should take 
priority over other sub communities (e.g. network operators, equipment vendors, service 
providers), even though sometimes a protocol design decision will need to strike a balance 
between the benefits to two or more sub communities. In such a case, any trade-offs must be 
documented and justified. If this Internet-Draft matures into an Internet standard, it will both 
enhance the clarity of the decision-making process (input legitimacy) and aid external parties 
when engaging with the results of the standards process (output legitimacy).
51
 In a similar vein, 
the ongoing work of the recently established „Human Rights Protocols Considerations‟ Research 
                                                     
49
  M Nottingham (27 October 2014) „Representing Stakeholder Rights in Internet Protocols‟, Internet-
draft (expired 30 April 2015) <https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nottingham-stakeholder-rights-00.txt> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
50
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Group explores how Internet standards can enable, strengthen or threaten human rights.
52 
The 
Group‟s frame of reference is confined to examining how protocols impact other external values 
(human rights). It will be of interest to see whether the Group will discuss in more substantive 
terms the interrelation between Internet standards and human rights.  
Consequently, the standard-setting process is receptive/open to external considerations as far as 
the impact of the IETF‟s work on the Internet community is concerned. Societal and broader 
interests, other values or public interest considerations are not examined in themselves;
53 
what is 
examined is how Internet standards affect different communities and stakeholders with regard to 
such broader interests and concerns. What the IETF thinks that it is mandated to do is to navigate 
through the “tussles”: different stakeholders have interests that may be opposed to each other and 
the standard-setting process aims to accommodate the existing tussles in a constructive fashion by 
making sure that the plurality of stakeholders‟ interests is duly acknowledged and, if need be, that 
a balance is struck in the course of the decision-making process.
54
 
C. The Reception of Internet Standards: “The Geeks Will Save the Internet”? 
Besides the fact that relevant stakeholders systematically implement the IETF standards, a strong 
indicator of the IETF‟s legitimacy is the positive and widespread reception of the standards by 
their addressees.
55
 In this instance, the addressees of these standards include every Internet user as 
well as a number of stakeholders with specific interests, including States, network operators, 
equipment vendors and specification implementers. States and other stakeholders underlined in 
the Tunis Agenda the immense contribution of the technical community to the shaping and 
evolution of the Internet.
56 
Furthermore, the industry sector and Internet users believe that „the 
courts and politicians are so naïve [and] the only way to retain the ability to communicate 
privately is to come up with a long-term technical solution.‟57 Even though technical solutions 
can lead to a technocratic government of experts,
58
 standardisation, in the present context, does 
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„Policy Considerations for Internet Standards‟ (expired 21 April 2011). 
54
  David D. Clark and others, „Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow‟s Internet‟, Proceedings of 
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  Statement by L Levison owner of Lavabit - Snowden‟s email service - in „Snowden Email Service 
Lavabit Loses Contempt Appeal‟, BBC News, 17 April 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
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not necessarily have negative connotations. “The geeks will save the Internet and privacy” is a 
prevalent narrative among Internet users.
59
 This strong social legitimacy seems to do justice to the 
values that this transnational community serves, and to its readiness to protect these values 
against external interference. One should recall that, when in 1992 the IETF participants thought 
that there was an attempt to interfere politically with its technical work and to establish internal 
hierarchies within the community, they declared that „We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We 
believe in: rough consensus and working code‟.60 The Internet‟s technical community is, or at 
least is perceived to be, the legitimate guardian of the network and the values it carries within it.  
 
3. Creating Informal Law-making for Protecting Privacy Online 
3.1 Appreciating Online Privacy as a Technical Issue  
Even though privacy has always been a peripheral issue in the work of the IETF and IAB, the 
recent disclosures on mass surveillance by States
61
 have forced the engineering community to 
face one of their major concerns, namely, the need to avoid exceeding their technical mandates or 
getting involved in politics. This section argues that the protection of online privacy falls within 
the remit of the standardisation bodies‟ work. The IETF and IAB have, in fact, decided to defend 
the network against (mass) surveillance. The IETF, however, does not value privacy as a human 
right per se or as a legal consideration; privacy is an instrumental value and it is viewed as a 
necessary condition for restoring and maintaining users‟ trust in the Internet.62 
It needs to be clarified from the outset that the work of the IETF, although technical, is not neutral 
or value-free.
63
 Since Internet protocols are a form of regulation by default, standardisation bodies 
also make choices by default.
64 
Furthermore, the IETF‟s mission statement clearly States that „the 
Internet isn‟t value-free and neither is the IETF‟.65 The IETF chooses to create certain technology 
by embracing specific technical concepts and ideas (decentralized control, edge-user 
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  R Brandom, „Snowden Calls on the Geeks to Save us from the NSA‟, The Verge (12 March 2014) 
<http://www.theverge.com/2014/3/12/5500290/snowden-calls-on-the-geeks-to-save-us-from-the-nsa> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
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  For further discussion, see Coleman (n 22) 180-183. 
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  UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) [2]-[4]. 
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  See Helen Nissenbaum, „Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?‟ 81 (2001) B.U.L.Rev. 635-
664 on the different meanings and nuances regarding the users‟ trust in the network. 
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  Froomkin (n 28) 808-812; Sandra Braman, „The Interpenetration of Technical and Legal Decision-
Making for the Internet‟ (2010) 13 Information, Communication & Society 309-324, 313; ML 
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empowerment and sharing resources).
66 
The IAB, for its part, is entrusted with protecting the 




The mandate of these bodies is not static: as the function and scope of the Internet evolves, so too 
will the role of the expert bodies entrusted with a public policy role in Internet governance. 
Protocol designers are more than familiar with the evolutionary nature of the Internet. In their 
view, the only principle of the Internet that will survive indefinitely is the principle of constant 
change: the architectural structure of the Internet is aimed at providing a set of rules (protocols) 
that generates a continuously evolving space of technology.
68 
This is clear both in how the 
Internet is envisioned and how Internet standards develop.
69 
Therefore, although these bodies are 
bound by their technical mandates, these mandates have to be read in the light of the needs of the 
users in whose name they act.
70 The protection of users‟ privacy is a serious and legitimate 
concern when designing and updating protocols. As discussed earlier, the affected parties‟ 
interests
71
 and the specification‟s contribution to the Internet‟s evolution are requirements to be 
addressed in the standardisation process. Even though the engineers‟ ability to anticipate threats 
to privacy is limited,
72
 the choices made in designing Internet protocols have profound 
implications for identifying and mitigating these threats.
73
  
The IETF and IAB have accepted that their mandates encompass privacy issues by their recent 
acknowledgment that serious and systematic violations of users‟ privacy pose significant risks to 
the reliable operation of the Internet. The IETF Chair proclaimed that pervasive monitoring is a 
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threat against which the Internet‟s engineers should defend.74 Many strong voices from within the 
technical community took the position that engineers should reconsider the impact of protocol 
and system design choices in light of the serious issues involved in the protection of privacy.
75
 In 
2014, the IETF asserted its strong consensus that „[pervasive monitoring] is an attack on the 
privacy of Internet users and organizations‟.76 The pervasive nature of monitoring by specific 
States in collaboration with non-State actors is considered to constitute a breakdown in trust: the 
capabilities and activities of the attackers are greater; monitoring is highly indiscriminate and on a 
very large scale; and the surveillance is pervasive in terms of content.
77
 In response to this attack 
on the network the technical bodies decided to expand their work by integrating privacy as a 
design requirement for the Internet standards (Privacy by Design). 
Nonetheless, one should not lose sight of the fact that the IETF does not regard privacy as a 
human rights issue, but rather as a technical matter related to the functioning of the network.
78
 
Due to the unique features of the Internet‟s architecture, any threats to users‟ privacy, equally 
qualify as threats to the fundamental value of the network: trust among its users. The core 
architecture of the network is its end-to-end design; this design, however, is based upon the 
presumption of trust.
79
 Threats and risks to privacy, and especially pervasive monitoring, directly 
impact the level of trust placed by users in the network: compromising users‟ privacy undermines 
the network because the network is its end users. According to the engineering community‟s 
mindset, pervasive monitoring is an attack because users‟ participation in the network is 
adversely affected, the free flow of information is inhibited and the integrity and confidentiality 
of information are endangered. Threats to users‟ privacy undermine the reliable operation and the 
responsible use of the network as a whole.  
3.2 The Technical “Solution” to Serious Threats to Privacy Online and its 
Relevance to International Human Rights Law 
                                                     
74
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<http://www.internetsociety.org/publications/ietf-journal-march-2014/message-from-the-ietf-chair> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
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76
  Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack (n 4) 2 (emphases added). 
77
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78
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<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3439.txt> accessed 1 May 2016; Dan L. Burk, „Federalism in Cyberspace 
Revisited‟ in Thierer, Crews (n 20) 119-157, 127. 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 7 NO 5]  
[16] 
 
The technical “solution” to serious threats to privacy online comprises of integrating Privacy by 
Design requirements into the Internet protocols. The first section discusses two specific threads of 
the IETF‟s ongoing standardisation work, namely, the introduction of a privacy vocabulary and 
encrypting the Web. The analysis shows that informal law-making in this area is relevant to 
business practices and legal regulation. The technical community takes into consideration and, in 
turn, informs legal aspects of, the right to privacy. In this sense, Internet standards can nurture 
and shape privacy-protection practices in business practices,
80 
and they have the potential to guide 
future regulation.
81 
At the same time, however, the protection embedded in the technology of the 
Internet standards is subject to any restrictions imposed by States. Similarly, the extent to which 
Privacy by Design features in the Internet protocols will impact end users depends on whether 
other stakeholders in the Internet‟s ecosystem, such as service providers, implement these 
protocols in all layers of the network. 
A. Integrating Privacy by Design into Internet Protocols 
Privacy by Design affects the way the Internet is designed as well as the IETF‟s philosophy. The 
foundational end-to-end design principle encapsulates the choice made in the early development 
of the Internet to leave security and privacy issues to be addressed by the end users. This choice 
served the purpose of keeping the core communication Internet protocols as simple as possible.
82 
It is for this reason that the Internet‟s engineers did not deem privacy to be a requirement when 
designing the Internet but rather something to be addressed by the end users.
83 
This essential 
design principle, however, rests upon the fact that the Internet was originally built by a 
community of like-minded professionals who trusted each other.
84
 In light of the unprecedented 
expansion of the Internet, and the recent revelations about state surveillance, the IETF re-
examined its decision to leave privacy and security issues to the end users. In this sense, the 
integration of privacy requirements into the Internet standards signifies a rearrangement of the 
IETF‟s standardisation philosophy and it indicates that privacy will be considered prior to 
                                                     
80
  Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (n 72). 
81
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designing new protocols or updating existing ones.
85
 The consequence of shifting from the 
approach of leaving privacy to the end user to introducing Privacy by Design into the Internet 
protocols is that the core architecture of the Internet will encapsulate a higher level of privacy-
protection features on a global level. This level of protection ensures stronger privacy protection 
than the (additional) measures taken by the individual user. The global interoperability of the 
network also ensures that privacy protection is ensured regardless of national borders, thereby 
mitigating threats to privacy and weakening the technical feasibility of conducting mass 
surveillance.  
i. Developing a Privacy Vocabulary 
In 2012 the IAB issued a report proposing, for the first time, a privacy-threat model with a 
specific focus on pervasive monitoring.
86
 The model addresses the question of how surveillance 
can be countered on a technical level.
87
 The IAB also established a privacy directorate to ensure 
that privacy considerations are considered and incorporated accordingly when drafting Internet 
standards.
88 This is an example of how the bodies‟ remain vigilant with regard to shaping their 
working culture and adapting their internal organisational structure. Furthermore, a notable 
contribution of this model is the creation of a privacy vocabulary, which defines privacy threats 
and establishes relevant terminology.
89 
The main aim of this vocabulary is to introduce privacy-
related concepts to the engineering community. Protocol designers need to be aware of specific 
engineering choices that can impact on privacy when crafting standards.
90 
Just as the legal 
community is struggling to comprehend the technical aspects of privacy, the technical community 
is also in the process of realising the value of privacy as a consideration in its work.
91 
 
What is particularly interesting about the development of a privacy vocabulary is its interrelation 
with privacy from a legal point of view. On the one hand, the technical community uses legal 
standards to inform its guidelines. The IETF not only documents the technical means employed to 
conduct mass surveillance, but also draws upon existing legal and policy privacy frameworks, 
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such as texts by the Council of Europe, the Fair Information Practices, and the OECD guidelines 
concerning the collection and use of personal data and the Privacy by Design concept.
92
 On the 
other hand, the technical community‟s work makes a relevant contribution to the legal community 
regarding the conceptualisation of privacy in cases of (mass) surveillance.
93
 A user-centric 
approach to privacy risks focuses on the ways in which end users feel threatened or suffer harm. 
The different types of privacy harm, including harm to financial standing, reputation, autonomy, 
and safety, are discussed at length.
94
 The IETF notes that „when individuals or their activities are 
monitored, exposed, or at risk of exposure, those individuals may be stifled from expressing 
themselves, associating with others, and generally conducting their lives freely. They may also 
feel a general sense of unease‟.95 „[T]he effects of surveillance on the individual can range from 
anxiety and discomfort to behavioral changes such as inhibition and self-censorship […] The 
possibility of surveillance may be enough to harm individual autonomy‟.96 The impact of 
surveillance or the possibility of surveillance, on the autonomy and behaviour of Internet users is 
crucial from a technical point of view in assessing the erosion of trust placed in the network. 
From a legal standpoint, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) aligns with this 
perspective as far as the meaning of interference with the right to privacy is concerned. The ECJ 
found that mass and indiscriminate surveillance is inherently disproportionate and constitutes an 
unwarranted interference with the rights guaranteed by articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter on the 
right to privacy and data protection respectively.
97
 More specifically, the ECJ held that the 
retention of traffic and location data without users being informed is likely to generate in the 
minds of the persons concerned the sense that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance.
98
 The collection of such data constitutes an interference with the right to privacy and 
it „does not matter whether the information on the private lives concerned is sensitive or whether 
the persons concerned have been inconvenienced in any way.‟99 An interference with the right to 
privacy takes place regardless of whether the data has subsequently been processed, used, or 
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accessed by State authorities; these acts qualify as separate interferences.
100 
There is already 
evidence supporting the chilling effects of mass surveillance on the trust placed in the network 
and the exercise of freedom of expression online.
101
 
Moreover, according to the IETF the possibility of covert surveillance suffices to threaten and 
adversely impact one‟s privacy. A similar nexus between the possibility of secret (mass) 
surveillance and the rights of personal autonomy and privacy is reflected in the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the recent Zakharov case the applicant claimed 
that there had been an interference with his privacy as a result of the mere existence of legislation 
permitting covert interception of mobile telephone communications and the risk of having been 
subjected to interception measures. The applicant was not in position to furnish evidence that 
specific interception measures had been ordered against him. The ECtHR, by taking a rather 
flexible approach to the applicant‟s victim status and standing, accepted his arguments: when it 
comes to cases in which the secrecy of measures renders them effectively unchallengeable at the 
domestic level, the individual does not have to demonstrate the existence of a risk that 
surveillance measures were actually taken against him.
102
 This position was reaffirmed in the 
Szabó and Vissy cases.
103 
It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will reinstate this approach in 
the high-profile pending case brought by Big Brother Watch, Open Right Group, English Pen and 
Constanze Kurz against the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In a 
similar vein, the applicants argue that GCHQ conducted generic surveillance and that it is likely 
that they have been subjected to such interference. The applicants also contend that the generic 
interception of communications is an inherently disproportionate interference with the right to 
privacy of thousands, perhaps millions, of people.
104
 If the ECtHR leans toward the Zakharov line 
of reasoning, it will be at variance with the Clapper judgment of the US Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court dismissed by a slim 5-4 majority the applicants‟ claims as highly speculative fears 
and found that they had no standing.
105 
In an unpersuasive judgment the Supreme Court held that 
there was no real likelihood that the Government will at some point intercept some of the 
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ii. Creating an Encrypted Web 
The IETF is currently focusing on security and encryption as one of the means to mitigate privacy 
threats.107 The Internet‟s engineers classify online surveillance as a combined security and 
privacy threat, underpinning the fact that security and privacy are interrelated.
108
 In November 
2014, the IAB issued a Statement on Internet Confidentiality in which it reaffirmed that the 
growth of the Internet depends on users having confidence that their private information is 
protected in the network.
109 
The IAB underscored the importance that protocol designers, 
developers and operators should make encryption the norm for Internet traffic. The on-going 
standardisation work on “opportunistic security” is aimed at ensuring some security, even when 
full end-to-end security is not possible.
110
 A few new working groups have been set up, focusing 
on areas within the Internet protocols that have been neglected from a privacy point of view, such 
as Internet traffic and metadata. The working group on using transport layer security (TLS) in 
applications was established to increase the security of transmissions over the Internet, including 
email communications.
111
 The Group has identified best practices in using TLS and 
unauthenticated encryption in future application definitions.
112
 Further, the working group on 
domain name system privacy considerations is developing a private exchange mechanism so that 
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DNS transactions and queries become more private.
113 
  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, in its Opinion 8/2014, and the European Data 
Protection Supervisor also acknowledge the interconnection between security concerns and 
privacy risks and violations.
114 
In general, however, policy-makers and lawyers have not digested 
the complex interrelation between network/national/individual security and privacy online: 
privacy and security are in many cases in a symbiotic rather than an antithetical relationship, and 
privacy can be a prerequisite for ensuring security.
115 
Moreover, the emphasis placed by the IETF 
on increasing security and anonymity regarding Internet traffic and metadata mirrors the serious 
concerns over the (illusive) distinction between the content of communications and metadata 
(other non-content information). The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has stressed that 
the distinction between content and metadata of communications is not persuasive, since 
metadata effectively reveal an individual‟s behaviour, social relationships, private preferences 
and identity.
116
 The ECJ in the Digital Rights case has held that traffic and location data, taken as 
a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning private lives.
117
 
Nonetheless, US courts have not (yet, at least) extended the Fourth Amendment protections on 
privacy to metadata used to route internet communications, including sender and recipient 
addresses on an email, or IP addresses.
118
 In November 2015 the US Supreme Court rejected an 
appeal to the USA v. Davis case to determine whether it is necessary to obtain a search warrant 
when law enforcement requests access to cell phone location data.
119
 Although the introduction of 
encryption as the norm on the Internet is a necessary condition for ensuring secure and private 
online communications, it is not sufficient notwithstanding that the impact of Internet Protocols is 
subject to their implementation by other stakeholders in Internet governance, as the next section 
will discuss.   
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B. Privacy by Design Subject to Law and Business Practices  
Privacy by Design as a technological/informal law-making standard embedded into Internet 
protocols is yet subject to law as well as business practices. To be accurate, it is the precise 
impact of the Internet standards to the Internet user‟s privacy that depends on how the Privacy by 
Design is implemented into all layers of the network. The IETF has thus far focused mostly on 
the design and update of core (low-layer) Internet protocols since it is difficult for protocol 
designers to foresee all pertinent privacy risks when browsers and web services implement 
standards. An innovative feature of the IETF‟s ongoing work is that it encourages the 
implementation of Privacy by Design into all layers of the Internet.
120 
Privacy by Design, 
entrenched in the Internet‟s architecture, should ideally be implemented by Privacy by Design 
policies set by service providers and Privacy by Design legal/regulatory obligations prescribed by 
States.  
Many States have taken certain steps toward Privacy by Design policies. Privacy by Design is 
now prescribed as a legal standard in the EU General Data Protection Regulation which replaced 
the EU Data Protection Directive.
121
 More specifically, Privacy by Design is a requirement that 
must be implemented by any person or organisation controlling the collection, processing, 
holding or use of personal information.
122
 It is the first document to define Privacy by Design as a 
legal obligation. Article 25 provides that „the controller shall […] implement appropriate 
technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to 
implement data protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to 
integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing […]‟. Despite the high hopes invested in 
this provision, its concrete implementation remains unclear due to the vague caveats to the scope 
of the obligations of the data controller.
123
 In addition, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Privacy Framework provides for the principle of preventing harm. The principle 
recognises that all means of regulating privacy - including technology, self-regulation and the law 
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- must be designed to prevent privacy harm to individuals.
124 
In a similar vein to the new EU 
Regulation, the principle affords no specific rights to individuals and no concrete obligations are 
imposed on data controllers.
125
 It remains, therefore, to be seen how these principles will be 
formulated and implemented in the national context of EU and APEC Member States. The APEC 
Privacy Framework retains its importance, if one bears in mind that APEC Member States‟ 
economies are located on four continents and account for one third of the world‟s population and 
almost half of world trade.  
Privacy by Design policies cannot be effectively implemented and mainstreamed unless they are 
supported by appropriate technological security measures. Despite the business sector‟s chronic 
reluctance to increase privacy-protection features,
126
 the post-Snowden era provided a greater 
incentive, by transforming privacy into a business advantage. Silicon Valley‟s leading companies 
(e.g. Apple, Google, Twitter, Facebook and Snapchat) concentrate their efforts on introducing 
device encryption and incorporating end-to-end encryption into online services.
127
 Google now 
tracks the encryption efforts - both at Google and on other popular websites by monitoring the 
progress made toward implementing HTTPS by default.
128
 Interesting synergies between human 
rights organisations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), companies and other 
stakeholders in Internet governance are also forged with respect to transport encryption in the 
form of HTTPS: “Let‟s Encrypt” is an initiative that aims at setting up an HTTPS server and 
running a certificate management agent on the web server. Hewlett Packard, Facebook, the 
Internet Society, Cisco, Mozilla, Gelmato are some of the stakeholders involved.
129
 
These initiatives have been received by States in an ambiguous fashion and one could say that 
state practice is in flux. On the one hand, data protection and other national authorities align with 
the need for security measures in order to ensure users‟ privacy. For instance, Article 29 of the 
Data Protection Working Party strongly recommends the application of Privacy by Design and 
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Security by Design, including cryptography, when designing and manufacturing technology.
130 
Moreover, States impose specific obligations on data controllers to ensure data security in order 
to avoid privacy breaches. The US Federal Trade Commission has sanctioned companies for 
having insufficient data security.
131
 The French Data Protection Authority has imposed fines on 
companies for violations of the security and confidentiality of their customers‟ personal data, on 
the basis that they did not provide secure access to the Internet or had not implemented HTTPS 
(encrypted) or other security protocols.
132
 Recently, the UK Information Commissioner Office 
has released updated guidance on the use of encryption stressing that encryption software should 




On the other hand, and in contradiction to what was mentioned previously, States are divided as 
to whether they should regulate encryption and anonymity tools. The current, highly politicised 
debate in the US on encrypted iPhones or the issue of accessing WhatsApp encrypted instant 
messaging in Brazil
134 
are the tip of the iceberg. States, including Russia, Morocco, Pakistan and 
Iran, have banned the use of encrypted communications altogether.
135
 Against this backdrop, 
Germany and the Netherlands are two of the few States strongly supporting end-to-end 
encryption.
136
 Interestingly, Germany has released the “Charta for Strengthening Confidential 
Communication” stressing that encryption should become a standard for the masses in their 
private communication.
137 
It seems that for the majority of States adopting a position is work-in-
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progress, which could be a positive indicator of subjecting possible changes to debate. The US 
after many „backs and forths‟ decided (for now) that it will not regulate encryption; the Indian 
government withdrew a draft encryption policy after public uproar over the proposed measures;
138 
and France seems to have abandoned its plans on banning Tor and other anonymity 
mechanisms.
139
 Encryption in communications is unlikely to be banned. Similarly, suggestions to 
build “backdoors” into systems or purposeful weaknesses that can be exploited to gain access 
have been officially dropped, although informal discussions with the private sector are on the 
table regarding granting access to unencrypted data or undermining data security and privacy. 
Most States, including China, France, the UK and the US, opt out for the “moderate” position of 
introducing targeted decryption orders.
140
  
From a human rights law point of view, restrictions to encryption and anonymity as enablers of 
the right to privacy and freedom of expression must meet the well-known human rights three-part 
test: any limitations need to be provided by law, serve a legitimate aim and conform to the 
necessity and proportionality requirements.
141
 Moreover, when States request disclosure of 
encrypted information procedural and judicial safeguards should be in place, including a judicial 
warrant. There is also merit in the argument that States have the positive obligation under the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy to actively promote and facilitate security 
of online communications.
142 
If such an obligation is read into the scope of these rights, the 
scrutiny of States‟ regulation of encryption and anonymity could be raised to a higher standard. 
Overall, the relevance of the international human rights law framework is noteworthy so that a 
clear point of reference is provided for policy-makers and judges on a universal level. Relying 
solely upon domestic law guarantees ignores the existing international safeguards and hinders 
their progressive development. Threats to privacy online are not anymore a matter to be framed 
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and discussed in terms of (western) democratic and non-democratic States, as it is being 
presented.
143
 Such distinctions are informative but they do not accurately reflect state practice 
and, therefore, they are meaningful to a certain extent.  
To sum up, from a technical point of view, privacy protection is no longer a mere concern, but is 
now a guiding, structural principle of protocol design embedded into the DNA of the Internet and 
further disseminated to the deployment of Internet protocols. Privacy protection has become a 
thread running through the fundamental fabric of the Internet tapestry.
144
 Following IETF‟s 
emphatic 2014 statement describing pervasive monitoring as an attack, and having demonstrated 
in this paper the rigorous and systematic technical work in progress, it is reasonable to expect that 
the efforts to support Privacy by Design in the Internet standards will be further intensified.
145
 
Internet standardisation is not, however, watertight and compartmentalised from legal and 
regulatory developments. The development of Internet standards toward protecting privacy online 
and enhancing security of communications is in a symbiotic relationship with international human 
rights law and business practices.
146
 This also involves that Privacy by Design entrenched into the 
Internet‟s technology and its impact to the Internet user is conditioned to how States will regulate 




4. Thinking Outside the “International Human Rights Law” Box 
One of the main aspects of the international law discussion on privacy (vis-à-vis either the 
domestic protection of privacy or other international angles on privacy) is privacy‟s status as an 
international human right. The added value that the international human rights paradigm brings is 
that it „provides the universal framework against which any interference in individual privacy 
rights must be assessed.‟148 Online privacy as a human right concerns, first, the applicability and, 
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second, the application of international human rights law to the digital environment. A series of 
recent developments in the United Nations has formally acknowledged that human rights apply 
online. The UN General Assembly, in its 2014 Resolution, affirmed for the first time that the 
right to privacy applies in digital communications and called upon States to respect their 
associated obligations.
149
 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Council has confirmed that the same 
rights that people enjoy offline must also be protected online, and has stressed that all States must 
address security concerns on the Internet in accordance with their human rights obligations.
150
 
The Human Rights Council also established the mandate for the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Privacy.
151 
Turning to the application of the right to privacy online, the OHCHR, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism have made 
important contributions in setting out the human rights law framework applicable to recent 
practices of States and other actors.
152 
They have underlined, in this respect, that mass or 
indiscriminate surveillance may be deemed arbitrary
153 
or even an inherently disproportionate 
interference with the right to privacy.
154 
 
Yet the discussion is in flux. It is not clear whether the international framework needs to be 
updated in order to accommodate technological advancements or whether a dynamic 
interpretation of the existing body of law will suffice. Suggestions at the UN level include the 
adoption of a new Optional Protocol to the ICCPR with regard to protecting privacy in the digital 
sphere,
155
 or that the Human Rights Committee revisit General Comments 16 and 31.
156 
Despite 
                                                     
149
  UNGA Res 68/167 (n 7); UNGA Res 69/166 (n 7).   
150
  Human Rights Council Resolution (n 7) [1] [5]. 
151
  „Human Rights Council Creates Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy‟, Press 
Statement, 26 March 2015 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15763&LangID=E> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
152
  Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc A/69/397, 23 September 2014. 
153
  UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) [25]; 2013 UN Report on Freedom of Expression (n 141) 
[81]-[83].  
154
  „Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situation by the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American 
States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information‟, 4 May 
2015 [8 (a)] <http://www.osce.org/fom/154846> accessed 1 May 2016. 
155
  The UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy recently called for a Geneva Convention for the Internet in A 
Alexander, The Guardian, 24 August 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/we-
need-geneva-convention-for-the-internet-says-new-un-privacy-chief> accessed 1 May 2016 Germany 
advocated negotiations within the EU on this matter; see „Measures for Better Privacy Protection - 
Progress Report‟, 14 August 2013 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/171155043/Measures-for-Better-
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 7 NO 5]  
[28] 
 
the possible usefulness of all the aforementioned ideas, one cannot fail to note that international 
law struggles to grasp and accommodate the concept and function of privacy in the online 
environment. This section argues that not only does the standardisation work of the IETF 
operationalize privacy by design and enrich our perception of privacy; it also provides an 
opportunity to inform the mindset of the international lawyer. Few international and/or human 
rights bodies and international lawyers have substantially engaged with the legal implications of 
the Internet‟s design principles and special features.157 The technical perspective on privacy, and 
the technical solutions to threats to privacy, should expand our legal imagination in terms of how 
the legal advisor argues on privacy, how the legislator articulates the interests at stake and how 
the academic and practitioner interpret existing law. The discussion that follows builds upon three 
examples which demonstrate the ways in which we could rethink our take on interpreting and 
applying international human rights law to privacy online. The first concerns the interrelation 
between privacy on the one hand and freedom of information and freedom of expression on the 
other, and how courts and legislators alike could take this interrelation into consideration. The 
second example addresses how the technical perspective could inform the policy-makers mind-set 
with regard to certain values invoked as limitations to privacy. Finally, the third case study 
attempts to revisit the relevance of the location and nationality of individuals in the digital 
environment.   
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Resolution (n 7, rec. 6) merely referred to the need to preserve people‟s confidence and trust in the 
network. The UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) the Human Rights Council in its 2012 
Resolution (n 7) and the UN General Assembly in its Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age (n 7) do not make any reference to the special features of the Internet. David Kaye and his Report 
on the use of encryption is a bright exception. 
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4.1 The Triptych of Privacy, Freedom of Expression and Security 
Recent developments demonstrate that many States are openly subjecting the free flow of 
information and the Internet‟s global reach to their national jurisdictions.158 These policies 
frequently take the form of introducing restrictions regarding data location and data export. The 
motivations driving such policies vary, but privacy is the primary justification put forward. States 
– ranging from Russia and Saudi Arabia to Brazil, Germany and France - argue for their right to 
“digital sovereignty”, invoking their citizens‟/residents‟ right to privacy, national security or even 
the development of the local economy.
159 
 
Addressing privacy as an intrinsic value for the integrity of the network provides informative 
insights on the human rights analysis. Protecting users‟ privacy, and their trust in the network, is 
tightly interconnected to freedom of information and the interoperability of the Internet at a 
global level. In other words, within the context of “privacy as a technical issue”, freedom of 
information and privacy are interlinked, and States are not able to easily invoke privacy as a 
possible limitation to freedom of information and trans-border data flows. In addition, a rigorous 
understanding of the value of privacy and trust from the technical point of view updates our 
understanding of the complex relationship between privacy, security and freedom of expression. 
In the online environment, these interests are interconnected in a distinctive fashion when 
compared to the offline environment. In many instances, the effective protection of privacy is a 
precondition for ensuring network, national and international security as well as safeguarding 
                                                     
158
  See the Government of India in Press Information Bureau – Government of India – Ministry of 
External Affairs, „Spy Program by the USA‟, 16 July 2014 
<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=106792> accessed 1 May 2016; and the Sixth 
BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration, 15 July 2014 [49] 
<http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
159
  See, for example, Russian Federal Law No. 242-FZ 2014 which entered into force on the 1
st
 
September 2015 and establishes the requirement to localise personal data held on Russian citizens in 
Russia. The German Parliament approved on 16
th
 of October 2015 a new data retention law with 
localisation requirements; see <https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/10/16/german-parliament-
adopts-data-retention-law-with-localization-requirement> accessed 1 May 2016. Also statement by 
Saudi Arabia arguing for each State‟s right to protect its citizens in the Third Committee of the 







Meetings, UNGA – Meetings Coverage, 18 December 2014 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11604.doc.htm> accessed 1 May 2016. For recent developments, 
see Anupam Chander, Uyên P. Lê, „Data Nationalism‟ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 677-739; 
Alexander Savelyev, „Russia‟s New Personal Data Localization Regulations: A Step Forward or a 
Self-imposed Sanction?‟ (2016) 32 CLSR 128-145; Francis Augusto Medeiros, Lee A Bygrave, 
„Brazil‟s Marco Civil da Internet: Does It Live up to the Hype?‟ (2015) 31 CLSR 120-130. 





The UN Rapporteur on Privacy has already underlined the critical role 




International and domestic bodies and courts should explore how this perspective informs legal 
reasoning in two respects. First, the strong interconnection between privacy and freedom of 
expression can be taken into account when freedom of expression is assessed as a proportionate 
and necessary restriction to the right to privacy, and vice versa. This is all the more the case since 
certain international courts - for instance, the ECtHR - seem to be predisposed toward protecting 
the right to privacy to the expense of acknowledging modern pronouncements of freedom of 
expression online (eg, re-use of or turning data and databases to readable and searchable 
formats).
162 
It would be also interesting to see how the ECtHR, in the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism and the 10 Human Rights Organisations cases, will discuss the allegation that the 
generic surveillance conducted by  GCHQ violated both the right to privacy and freedom of 




Second, domestic and international courts need to acknowledge and “translate” in legal and 
human rights law terms the symbiotic relationship between security, on the one hand, and privacy 
and freedom of expression on the other hand. Privacy and security can be mutually supportive 
goals and, therefore, courts need to appreciate their interrelation in a non-conflictual fashion.
164 
Security measures that aim to strengthen the protection of privacy should be carefully assessed. 
Weakening encryption, for example, will have serious ramifications not only to undermining the 
effective exercise of the right to privacy and freedom of expression
165 
but also to compromising 
                                                     
160
  UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, „Apple-FBI case could have serious global ramifications 
for Human Rights‟, Press Release, 4 March 2016 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17138&LangID=E> 
accessed 1 May 2016.  
161
  UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) [24]-[25]. 
162
  Satakunman Markkinapopsski and Satamedia OY v Finland, 21 July 2015. The case was referred to 
and is currently pending before the Grand Chamber.  
163
  Pending cases: Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v United Kingdom (communicated 
case on 5 January 2015), Application No 62322/14; 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v 
United Kingdom (communicated case on 24 November 2015), Application No 24960/15. 
164
  Third party intervention to the 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others case, 18 March 2016, 10, 
<https://epic.org/2016/03/epic-intervenes-in-privacy-cas.html> accessed 1 May 2016. 
165
  UN Report on the use of encryption and anonymity in digital communications (n 135); Letter 
addressed to the Hon. Sheri Pym in the Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 ED No. 
CM 16-10 (SP) 
<https://www.apple.com/pr/pdf/Letter_from_David_Kaye_UN_Special_Rapporteur_on_the_promoti
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national and international security.
166
 In this regard, the courts‟ role will be instrumental in 
articulating and, if necessary, balancing the respective interests in ad hoc cases as well as 
pronouncing on the compatibility of recently introduced pieces of legislation regulating or 
banning encryption and/or anonymity (discussed earlier) or implementing domestic surveillance 
programs. For instance, although the French Constitutional Court validated a recent domestic law 
implementing a surveillance program, thirteen complaints are currently pending before the 
ECtHR against this decision.
167 
Conversely, the English High court issued a landmark judgment 
in David & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department declaring the 2014 Data Retention 
and Investigatory Powers Act to be unlawful.
168
 The views of data protection authorities will also 
be informative judging from the strong stance of Hamburg‟s data protection watchdog on 
preserving anonymity and the right to use pseudonyms online.
169 
4.2 Privacy and Bringing Values and Cultural Considerations into Play 
Furthermore, the human rights perspective brings debates on values and cultural diversity to the 
surface. Certain States contended, in a draft resolution to the General Assembly, that respect for 
human rights online, including privacy, should be balanced against the cultural considerations and 
social systems of all countries.
170
 Despite the fact that the HRC adopted the 2014 resolution on 
the right to privacy in the digital age without a vote, China, supported by South Africa, brought 
an oral amendment to the discussion of the draft resolution. The amendment concerned the 
inclusion of a paragraph in the resolution warning of the dangers that the Internet poses in terms 
of terrorism, extremism, racism and religious intolerance. Although the oral amendment was 
voted down,
171
 fifteen States supported the amendment, which makes it clear that there is no 
                                                                                                                                                              
on_and_protection_of_the_right_to_freedom_of_opinion_and_expression.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016. 
166
  UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, „Apple-FBI Case Could Have Serious Global 
Ramifications for Human Rights‟, Press Release, 4 March 2016 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17138&LangID=E> 
accessed 1 May 2016; Susan Landau, Individual Statement, Berkman Centre for Internet & Society, 
„Don‟t Panic. Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate‟, 1 February 2016. 
167
  The French Constitutional Court validated the recent Law 912/2015 (24 July 2015) implementing a 
surveillance program <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2c230c55-43c6-4452-ad04-
d6be99e15a2f> accessed 1 May 2016. 
168
  David & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092. 
169
  <http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/03/pseudonym-ruling-facebook-claims-real-name-policy-
protects-users/> accessed 1 May 2016. 
170
  Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, 66
th
 
Session, UN Doc A/66/359, 14 September 2011, 4. The draft was subsequently co-sponsored by 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
171
  The oral amendment was voted down by twenty-eight to fifteen votes. The states that voted in favour 
of the amendment were: Algeria, China, Congo, Cuba, Namibia, Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
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global consensus on Internet-related or privacy-related issues.
172
 Therefore, even though the 
human rights angle puts pressure on States regarding the protection of online privacy, it also 
brings considerations which are invoked to place limitations on the effective exercise of privacy 
rights and which are usually construed very broadly. In this way, legal regulation may undermine 
the interoperability of the Internet.
173 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the technical approach to privacy lays the basis for a less heated 
cultural debate and promotes a language that certain States would perhaps be more willing to 
accept. The technical perspective highlights the significance of users‟ privacy to the development 
of the digital economy. The growth of the Internet depends on users having confidence that their 
private information is secure and, consequently, privacy online is not only a human right, but also 
an enabler of public trust in the network.
174 
Such a strategy can be persuasive when addressing 
policy-makers from specific regions of the world as well as when motivating all law-makers to 
enhance legal and technical privacy safeguards.
175
 The International Conference of Data 
Protection, Privacy Commissioners and the European Data Protection Authorities as well as the 
APEC leaders have acknowledged the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the network as 
a value in itself.
176 
There is, however, merit in arguing that the technical approach to privacy 
deprives the discussion of its socio-political dimensions.
177
 It cannot go unnoticed that the human 
rights approach to cyberspace does not only refer to strictly speaking the applicability and 
                                                                                                                                                              
South Africa, UAE, Venezuela, Vietnam. Four States abstained (Gabon, India, Indonesia and the 
Philippines).    
172
  cf C Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, who celebrated the existence of a „global alliance 
for the freedom on the internet‟ when the Human Rights Council adopted its 2012 Resolution (n 7) on 
the freedom of information on the Internet in „A Victory for the Internet‟, New York Times, 5 July 
2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/carl-bildt-a-victory-for-the-internet.html?_r=3&> 
accessed 1 May 2016.  
173
  „The Rule of Law on the Internet and in the Wider Digital World‟, Issue Paper published by the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, December 2014, 40 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2268589> accessed 1 May 2016. 
174
  IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality (n 77). 
175
  See also Susan Shrink‟s comment, „Should Internet Censorship be Considered a Trade Issue?‟, 12 
April 2016 <https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/should-internet-censorship-be-considered-trade-
issue> accessed 1 May 2016. 
176
  2013 Resolution (n 155); „Joint Statement of the European Data Protection Authorities Assembled in 
the Article 29 Working Party‟, 25 November 2014, points 1 & 4 <http://europeandatagovernance-
forum.com/pro/fiche/quest.jsp;jsessionid=oxBeuLGjbMbcy3ofZYYEunXT.gl2?surveyName=&main
=&pg=&pg2=&pg3=&locale=1&_zz0_=&_zz1_=&_zz2_=&_zz3_=&_zz4_=&_zz5_=&_zz6_=&_z
z7_=&_zz8_=&_zz9_=&_scrollX=0&_scrollY=0> accessed 1 May 2016; 23
rd
 Leaders‟ Declaration, 
Building Inclusive Economies, Building a Better World: A Vision for an Asia-Pacific Community, 19 
November 2015, point 3 (e) <http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/2015/2015_aelm.aspx> accessed 1 May 2016. 
177
  For an excellent argument regarding the encryption debate see Sedra Gürses, Arun Kundnami, Joris 
Van Hoboken, „Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-surveillance Advocacy‟ (2016) 
Media, Culture & Society 1-15. 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 7 NO 5]  
[33] 
 
application of human rights online but also introduces a “humanisation” narrative of the Internet. 
This narrative brings in the mediation of power between State and individual and sets the 
parameters for defining the issues at stake or even prioritising dissonant interests. Many state and 
non-State stakeholders endorse a rights-based approach to cyberspace. The NETmundial Multi-
stakeholder Statement on the Future of Internet Governance devoted a section to “Human Rights 
and Shared Values” and proceeded to proclaim that the Internet standards must be consistent with 
human rights.
178 The Council of Europe‟s Committee of Ministers has underlined (in the 2011 
Declaration on Internet Governance Principles) the need for a “rights-based approach to the 
Internet”.179 ISOC also employed human rights language and discourse by welcoming the “formal 
endorsement of a rights-based approach for the Internet”.180 Understanding and arguing for 
privacy could and should include different narratives and strategies highlighting different aspects 
of the discussion depending on the geographical/political context and the stakeholders involved. 
4.3 The Requirements of Nationality and Location of Individuals (or Data) 
Safeguarding privacy as a sine qua non for the network‟s proper functioning casts a new light on 
the discussion of the nationality and location of individuals as requirements under international 
human rights law. These questions do not seem to be entirely settled in human rights law and 
practice, despite the recent strong pronouncements by the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.
181 
According to the technical viewpoint, 
neither the nationality nor the location of the individuals under surveillance is a critical - or even 
relevant – variable, since the Internet transcends national boundaries. A threat to users‟ privacy, 
and consequently to the network, exists regardless of nationality or the geographical 
particularities in question. It is of particular interest that claims that have been regarded until 
recently as policy considerations at best are now articulated as legal arguments raised before 
                                                     
178
  NETmundial Statement (n 8) 7. 
179
  CoE Declaration on Internet Governance Principles (n 144) [5] (emphases added). 
180
  „Internet Society Welcomes Adoption of Resolution on Human Rights and the Internet at 20th Human 
Rights Council‟, 9 July 2012 <http://www.internetsociety.org/news/internet-society-welcomes-
adoption-resolution-human-rights-and-internet-20th-human-rights> accessed 1 May 2016 (emphases 
added). 
181
  UN Report on the Right to Privacy (n 3) [31]-[36] [47]; Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 
UN Doc. A/69/397, 23 September 2014 [62]; UNGA Res 69/166 (n 7). The Human Rights Committee 
has also emphasized the importance of „measures to ensure that any interference with the right to 
privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity, regardless of the 
nationality or location of individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance‟, 
Concluding Observations of the fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 April 2014 [22 (a)] (emphasis added). See Marco Milanović, „Human Rights 
Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age‟ (2015) 86 Harv.Intl‟l.L J. 81-146. 
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courts and other bodies, and given great weight by judges and policy-makers respectively. The 
work of Article 19, an international NGO dedicated to the protection of freedom of expression, is 
noteworthy. Article 19, in its oral statement to the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on 
Privacy, argued for the human right to online privacy by adopting the technical community‟s own 
mind-set; it States that:   
„[w]here privacy online is threatened, trust in the Internet evaporates. Pervasive, 
untargeted and unchecked surveillance, including the interception, collection or retention 
of communications or meta-data, is a systemic and structural attack on the Internet, 
regardless of the nationality or location of the “target” ‟.182  
Access Now and the CDT, in their amicus curiae briefs to US District Court of California 
regarding the matter of the search of an Apple iPhone seized during the execution of a search 
warrant, have devoted large sections of their arguments to the unintended detriment to end users, 
public trust in technology and digital security around the world, should the US Court decide to 
grant the FBI‟s request.183 These arguments have become legally relevant because we are now 
exploring and conceptualising the legal implications of the nature of the Internet. The arguments 
underline the global implications of acts or omissions of state authorities even if they take place 
within a state‟s territory. Clearly, although this does not entail that the nationality and location 
requirements under international human rights law became somewhat obsolete, such 
considerations and arguments inform a judge‟s approach. Despite this, there are instances in 
which courts do not seem to properly apply basic concepts of international human rights law 
regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by a State let alone read the concept of jurisdiction under the 
technical perspective. In the Human Rights Watch Inc & Ors case the UK Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal curiously dismissed the claim that the United Kingdom could have the obligation to 
respect the right to privacy of an individual outside the country.
184
 
                                                     
182
  UNHRC, „Oral Statement on Freedom of Expression in the Digital Age‟, 12 September 2014 
<http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37686/en/unhrc:-oral-statement-on-freedom-of-
expression-in-the-digital-age> accessed 1 May 2016 (emphases added). 
183
  Brief of Amici Curiae Access Now and Wickr Foundation in Support of Apple Inc.‟s Motion to 
Vacate, in the Matter of the Search of An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search 
Warrant, United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No 5:16-cm-00010-
SP-1 <http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/Access_Now_and_Wickr_Foundation.pdf> accessed 1 May 
2016; Brief of the Center for Democracy & Technology as Amicus Curiae in Support of Apple Inc.‟s 
Motion to Vacate <http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/Center_for_Democracy_and_Technology.pdf> 
accessed 1 May 2016. 
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  Human Rights Watch Inc & Ors v The Secretary for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ors 
[2016] UKIPTrib 15_165-CH, [58]. 
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Conversely, a state cannot extend its jurisdiction outside its national borders by way of 
circumventing privacy protection. The US Supreme Court has recently approved a rule change 
that could allow law enforcement to remotely search computers around the world.
185 
Under the 
proposed change the government would be able to obtain a single warrant to access and search - 
essentially hack - any number of computers simultaneously regardless of their location or whether 
the users are a threat to national security or suspected of any crime.
186
 Such a practice not only 
subverts legal safeguards of privacy in both in the US and in third States but also compromises 
the functioning of the network. It is difficult to anticipate how the unpredictable nature of 
government malware to infiltrate user devices will perform in the real world. Government 
hacking also broadly undermines the security of the global Internet.
187
 Similar suggestions for 





execution of a US warrant to hand over a customer‟s email stored in a data centre in Ireland is 
also an attempt to evade human rights law safeguards in the territory of another state by putting 
pressure on a corporation (Microsoft).
190
 It is true that data does not follow the predictable paths 
of the physical world and that the law and law enforcement need to keep up with the evolution of 
technology. The legal means to do so, however, need to serve transparency and respect 
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  Rule 41 (b) (6) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that „at the request of a federal law 
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government (…) a magistrate judge with authority in any 
district where activities related to a crime have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote 
access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information 
located within or outside that district‟  
available at <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2819194-frcr16-
8mad.html#document/p9/a291884> accessed 12 May 2016. The Supreme Court referred the change to 
US Congress, which will have until 1 December 2016 to modify, reject, or defer the proposal. If the 
House of Representatives and Senate do not pass a resolution in favor by simple majority, the 
revisions will become law that same day. 
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  Danny Yadron, „Supreme Court Grants FBI Massive Expansion of Powers to Hack Computers‟ 29 
April 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/29/fbi-hacking-computers-warrants-
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MAY 2016. 
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  DAVID CONNETT AND OTHERS, „UK GOVERNMENT REWRITES SURVEILLANCE LAW TO GET AWAY 
WITH HACKING AND ALLOW CYBER ATTACKS, CAMPAIGNERS CLAIM‟, THE INDEPENDENT, 15 
MAY 2015 <HTTP://WWW.INDEPENDENT.CO.UK/LIFE-STYLE/GADGETS-AND-TECH/NEWS/UK-
GOVERNMENT-REWRITES-SURVEILLANCE-LAW-TO-GET-AWAY-WITH-HACKING-AND-ALLOW-
CYBER-ATTACKS-CAMPAIGNERS-10253485.HTML> ACCESSED 1 MAY 2016. 
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  TIM CUSHING, „DUTCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO LET INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE MORE 
HACKING & MASS SURVEILLANCE POWERS‟, 9 JULY 2015 
<HTTPS://WWW.TECHDIRT.COM/ARTICLES/20150706/09575131559/DUTCH-GOVERNMENT-MOVES-
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  See <http://digitalconstitution.com/about-the-case/> accessed 1 May 2016. 
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international and national standards of online privacy. The use of means of transnational 
cooperation, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, is a preferable way of thinking the way 
forward in such instances.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The legal nature and effects of informal law-making are context-specific and should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis, given the plurality of informal norms that may be taken into 
consideration. There is no doubt that Internet standards, set by the IETF and IAB, are not legally 
binding, nor do they have the potential to evolve into something binding. Internet standards, 
nonetheless, frame, and to a great extent shape, the user‟s choices online and therefore constitute 
a powerful regulatory force.  
Even though the Internet standards-setting process does not observe traditional law-making 
formalities, there is strong evidence to suggest that the IETF meets high standards of 
transparency, inclusiveness and legitimacy. There is, however, scope for engaging a broader 
spectrum of stakeholders in the standardisation process, and for promoting greater diversity 
within the IETF community. Of particular interest for the present discussion was the question of 
whether the bodies‟ technical mandate allows broader societal interests to be taken into 
consideration. The analysis found that the standard-setting process is open to external 
considerations insofar as the impact of the IETF‟s work on the Internet community and its 
contribution to the evolution of the Internet is concerned. Societal and broader interests, other 
values or public interest considerations are not examined in themselves; what is examined is how 
Internet standards affect different communities and stakeholders with regard to such broader 
interests and concerns. The IETF needs to navigate through the “tussles” and constructively 
accommodate the - possibly competing - interests of different stakeholders and sub communities 
within the Internet community.   
Building upon these findings, the discussion turned to examine the computer engineers‟ approach 
to privacy online. The IETF has declared in the most emphatic terms that mass surveillance and 
serious threats to users‟ privacy are an attack on the reliable operation of the network. In this 
context, privacy online has an instrumental value as a necessary condition for retaining trust in 
the network. The IETF decided to become a guardian of privacy online, and to integrate Privacy 
by Design into the core Internet architecture as a requirement when creating and updating 
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standards. This has a series of implications for the IETF‟s design philosophy, its organisational 
structure and the level of privacy protection contained within technology and afforded to global 
end users. It was argued that the technical discussion of many aspects of privacy interacts in 
manifold ways with the legal and human rights approaches to privacy: they enhance each other‟s 
understanding of the specificities of the online environment and they converge in their 
understanding of the meaning of interference in cases of mass surveillance. Moreover, Internet 
standards operationalize a given level of privacy protection. At the same time, the precise impact 
of Privacy by Design incorporated into protocols for the benefit of the end user is dependent on 
the practices of service providers on the application layer of the network and on state legislation.  
Crucially, the technical community‟s approach to privacy is an opportunity for international 
lawyers to rethink how we articulate, and argue for, privacy online from the point of view of 
international human rights law. For instance, the distinctive interconnection between privacy and 
freedom of information/expression online, or the relevance of the users‟ location and nationality, 
are issues that we need to reconsider in legal reasoning and in balancing the relevant interests.  
 
